Compare Elop to his Predecessor Kallasvuo. One was Bad. One was The Worst Ever

So now that the Elop Era has passed at Nokia, we can compare the two failed Nokia CEOs. The golden boy at Nokia was Jorma Ollila. His successor, Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo known as OPK became Nokia CEO in the Spring of 2006. He stayed for four years, but was ousted as Nokia reported increasingly bad results, including its first quarterly corporate loss in more than a decade, and after the Nokia share price had fallen 55% during his four-year tenure.

OPK was replaced by Stephen Elop in the Autumn of 2010. Elop only managed 3 years before he was removed from the post of CEO. As OPK came in during Q2 of 2006, and Elop took over after Q2 of 2010, and Elop was removed after Q2 of 2013, we can compare the two CEOs with reasonably fair 'Apples-to-Apples' comparison of Q2 of 2006 (Jorma Ollila's time) to Q2 of 2010 (OPK) vs Q2 now, of 2013 (Elop). We can also take the last full calendar year, 2005 for Ollila, 2009 for OPK, and 2012 for Elop. Lets compare the two Nokia 'failures' to see how they compare.

NOKIA UNDER KALLASVUO

Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo achieved the following, if comparing his last Q2 in 2010, to the last Q2 still partly under Jorma Ollila, in 2006. OPK was indeed achieving declines on several of Nokia's measured results. Comparing to four years before, remember, the total mobile and telecoms industry has been growing, OPK's last Quarter saw the declines of Nokia profits by 56% from 1.5 Billion Euros per quarter under Ollila to 660 million Euros under Kallasvuo. Nokia's handset unit saw its profits decline less, but still, a significant 34% decline from 979 million Euros per quarter to 647 million. Of Nokia's three critical regions, Europe, China and North America, North America had not grown, but had seen a very alarming 50% decline down to 2.6 million phones sold per quarter.

If we compare last calendar year, so comparing OPK's 2009 full year, to Jorma Ollila's last full year, 2005, we see that under Kallasvuo, Nokia profits fell 74% from 4.6 Billion Euros per year down to 1.2 Billion. Nokia's handset unit profits were down a bit, 8%, down from 3.6 Billion Euros to 3.3 Billion Euros over the four-year period. Regionally almost identical results, North America was the region that fell, and 47% when we use the last calendar year as the metric, down to 13.5 million handsets sold in North America in 2009 vs 25.3 Nokia branded handsets sold in North America four years earlier under Jorma OIllila.

Certainly when we combine the above performance with the share price fall of 55% in value over four years, OPK had been a poor CEO and it was a fair decision to replace him. He was not steering Nokia well enough. But lets be fair. Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo's period was indeed a 'mixed bag' - there was also plenty of good news with the bad. Consider:

If we use the Q2 to Q2 comparison of the four years, then while yes, Nokia corporation profits fell, the overall revenues were about flat (2% growth) from 9.8 Billion to 10.0 Billion Euros per quarter. The critical part was the handset unit, where revenues grew strongly by 16% from 5.9 Billion Euros quarterly to 6.8 Billion Euros. The handset unit volumes were up very strongly by 42% from 78.4 million to 111.1 million handset units sold per quarter, and where Nokia's future was - the smarpthones unit - had the best growth of them all, more than doubling in four years, up 167% from 9.0 million units to 24.0 million units per quarter. And regionally, yes North America was down, but North America is not the future of the handset market. How was Nokia doing in China? Under OPK that North American decline of 50% was more than made up by the 65% growth in China which already by then was bigger than the US market in overall handsets sold (all handsets, not just smartphones. Today China is 50% bigger than the US even in smartphones alone).

And to compare last calendar year, 2009 under OPK to 2005 under Ollila, again, its a mixed bag. Yes, Nokia profits are down but Nokia overall revenues grew 20% in the four years under OPK from 34.2 Billion Euros to 41.0 Billion. Yes, the handset unit profits were down but overall handset unit revenues were up by a very healthy 34% from 20.8 Billion Euros per year to 27.9 Billion Euros. The overall handset division reported unit sales up 24% to 431.8 million sold per year, and the smartphone unit sales - where the future of Nokia was - this unit reported sales up by 74% from 39.0 million to 67.8 million smarpthone units sold per year. European sales were slightly up, 7% but China was up 42% to 72.6 million units per year, while North America was down 47% to 13.5 million units per year.

Yes, Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo was not a good enough CEO for Nokia. He achieved growth in revenues, but declining profits (but was still profitable). He achieved growth in handset units and revenues, but the handset profits declined (but were still profitable). He did yes see North America sales decline but China grew much more than what was lost in North America and that was the right choice, considering how much bigger, and how much faster China was growing than North America. Finally, the future of Nokia, its smarpthone unit - was reporting the best growth and strong revenues during Kallasvuo. Nokia did not break out the profitability of the smartphone unit until later, but we did find out that during the end of the period, the smartphone unit was delivering strong double-digit profits even in the final months of OPK's tenure. The most critical number, Nokia's smartphone migration rate - migrating customers from dumbphones to smartphones - led the industry and was ahead of the global average. So Nokia was actually picking up market share, when it shifted from dumbphones to smartphones under Kallasvuo. Yes, there were bad results, especially the share price down by 55% but yes, Kallasvuo produced profits and growth in revenues. It was not all bad news.

WHAT ABOUT ELOP?

So lets compare to Elop. Take all those measures. Every one of them. And the results are worse under Elop than under Kallasvuo. Yes, every single measure is worse. Lets again take first the Q2 to Q2 comparison, latest quarter, in 'Apples-to-Apples' comparison of performance.

Under Kallasvuo Nokia reported growth in revenues. Under Elop the quarterly revenues fell 43% from 10.0 Billion Euros in Q2 of 2010 to 5.7 Billion Euros now. Under OPK there was a decline in profits but Nokia corporation was still profitable. After three years of Elop, Nokia was now unprofitable. This is total disaster as CEO, if you abandon profits and start to produce losses. 

Under Kallasvuo the overall revenues of the handset unit grew 16%, under Elop, comparing Q2 of 2013 to Q2 of 2010, the handset revenues fell 60% from 6.8 Billion Euros to 2.7 Billion Euros. Under OPK the handset unit profits declined but there were still strong profits. Under Elop those profits were turned into losses. He replaced 647 million Euros of quarterly profits with a quarterly loss of 33 million Euros. OPK saw a 42% increase in quarterly unit sales of handsets. Elop switched that to a decline of 45% in quarterly unit sales of handsets. The smartphone unit under Kallasvuo saw more than doubling of sales to 24.0 million per quarter, under Elop that fell by more than half, down by 69% to 7.4 million units of smartphones sold per quarter. Regionally, the European market saw a fall of 57%, the Chinese market collapsed by 79% and the North American market - where Elop was supposed to save this, and the Microsoft alliance was supposed to help, Nokia fell only 50% under OPK but crash-dived down 81% in less time, under Elop. North American handset sales down from 2.6 million per quarter to 500,000 units per quarter by the time Elop was done.

The exact same pattern holds for comparing the last Calendar Years, OPK's 2009 vs Elop's 2012. If OPK was a 'failure' by any measure, Elop is far worse by every one of those measures. OPK at least saw Nokia revenue growth, annually 20% during his four years, up to 41.0 Billion Euros. Under Elop's three years, that was smashed down by 26% to 30.2 Billion Euros. Nokia's annual profits under OPK's last year were 1.2 Billion Euros. Elop swapped that for losses of 2.3 Billion Euros per year (a negative swing of 3.5 Billion Euros per year!!! This is one of the worst performances just in terms of profits, by any CEO). 

OPK saw handset unit revenues up 34%, under Elop they were slashed by 44% down from 27.8 Billion Euros per year to 15.7 Billion Euros. Kallasvuo at least generated profits in the handset unit, of 3.3 Billion Euros annually in 2009. Under Elop that was exchanged in favor of annual losses of .. 1.1 Billion Euros. The handset unit sales grew 24% under OPK, they were down 22% under Elop, from 431.8 million to 335.6 million handsets. The smartphone unit annual sales were up 74% under OPK, they were down 48% annually under Elop, from 67.8 million to 35.1 million. European sales were up by 7% under Kallasvuo, down 37% under Elop. Chinese sales up 42% under Kallasvuo, down 62% under Elop. And North American annual sales were down 47% under Kallasvuo, they collapsed 84% under Elop. 

And the share price under Elop, fell over 80% in two and a half years. Elop matched the 55% fall that Kallasvuo saw in a three-year period, Elop matched that in five months. The Nokia share price recovered a little bit only after rumors emerged that Nokia is about to being sold.

Yes, by every single measure, if you thought Kallasvuo was a failure as CEO, Elop was far worse. By not some measures, by every single measure, in less time, Elop achieved greater damage to Nokia than Kallasvuo. No wonder they now say, that compared to Elop, Kallasvuo was a saint..

Of course we now know why this happened. Kallasvuo did not have a contract with a clause that would reward him 25 million dollars for wrecking Nokia corporation totally and causing its handset unit to be sold. Elop did. And thus Elop did what we witnessed. But hey, lets take one more comparison.

ELOP FIRST 6 MONTHS

There is a very interesting comparison. Elop wasn't hired until during Q3, but if we take the last quarter he was not in charge, Q2 of 2010, and compare to the last quarter before his new strategy was announced, meaning Q4 of 2010, we get an interesting 6 month period of the trends that Elop was presiding over, when he started. What did his first half-year look like, in terms of Nokia performance. And compared to the last reported by his immediate predecessor, OPK? This gets interesting:

Comparing Q4 of 2010 to Q2 of 2010, same year, the last full quarter under OPK vs first full quarter under Elop - was Nokia indeed so deeply in trouble, it had to 'jump off a burning platform' or was Nokia actually on the mend, improving and competitive? Lets see what the facts tell us:

Nokia revenues had recovered to strong growth, up 26%, from 10.0 Billion Euros to 12.6 Billion. The declining profits under Kallasvuo had reversed to strongly growing profits - yes, under first months of Elop leadership Nokia overall corporate quarterly profits were up 65% from 660 million to 1.1 Billion Euros. Handset revenues which had grown under Kallasvuo merely 16% over a four year period, under Elop had grown 24% in just six months. Nokia handset profits which had been in decline, were now up a massive 49% from 647 million to 961 million Euros per quarter. Nokia handset sales were up 11% in just six months vs 42% of 48 months under OPK - the handset unit growth rate had doubled. Smartphone unit sales were up nearly twice that in the same period, up a massive 18% to 28.3 million per quarter. The regional sales in Europe were up 28%, in China up 13% and the North American sales collapse - had ended! Nokia sales in North America were flat for the first time, remaining the same 2.6 million under the first quarter under Elop as it was under the last full quarter of Kallasvuo's leadership.

Nokia share price had climbed 11% on all the good news. This is excellent by the new CEO. He should have continued that - except that he had not as strong an incentive to do the hard work, he got a much bigger incentive if he could wreck Nokia. Here are the metrics for comparison (I have colored them so you can easily see, which numbers went up - green, and which went down - red). Quarterly and Annual

QUARTERLY METRICS, LAST QUARTER IN CHARGE, OLLILA VS KALLASVUO VS ELOP AT NOKIA

Item . . . . . . . . . . Ollila Q2 2006 . . . Kallavuo Q2 2010 . . . Elop Q2 2013
Nokia Revenue . . . 9.8 B Euro . . . . . 10.1 B Euro . . . . . . . 5.7 B Euro
Profit/Loss . . . . . . 1.5 B Euro profit . . 0.7 B Euro profit . . . 0.1 B Euro loss

Handset Revenue . 5.9 B Euro . . . . . . 6.8 B Euro . .  . . . . 2.7 B Euro
Handset profit . . . . 1.0 N Euro profit . . 0.7 B Euro profit . . 0.03 B Euro loss

Handset units . . . . .78.4 million . . . . . 111.1 million . . . . . 61.1 million
Smartphone units . . . 9.0 million . . . . . . 24.0 million . . . . . 7.4 million

China sales . . . . . . . 12.1 million . . . . . 19.3 milllion . . . . . 4.1 milllion
North America sales . 5.2 million . . . . . . . 2.6 milllion . . . . . 0.5 milllion

Source Nokia quarterly results

Same information comparing full year 2005 to 2009 to 2012, the last calendar year that each of the three CEO's was in charge,

ANNUAL METRICS, LAST YEAR IN CHARGE, OLLILA VS KALLASVUO VS ELOP AT NOKIA

Item . . . . . . . . . . Ollila 2005 . . . . . . Kallavuo 2009 . . . . . Elop 2012
Nokia Revenue . . . 34.2 B Euro . . . . . 41.0 B Euro . . . . . . 30.2 B Euro
Profit/Loss . . . . . . 4.6 B Euro profit . . 1.2 B Euro profit . . . 2.3 B Euro loss

Handset Revenue . 20.8 B Euro . . . . . . 27.9 B Euro . .  . . . 15.7 B Euro
Handset profit . . . . 3.6 B Euro profit . . . 3.3 B Euro profit . . 1.1 B Euro loss

Handset units . . . . .347.0 million . . . . . 431.8 million . . . . . 335.6 million
Smartphone units . . 39.0 million . . . . . . 67.8 million . . . . . . 35.1 million

China sales . . . . . . . 51.0 million . . . . . 72.6 milllion . . . . . 47.5 milllion
North America sales . 25.3 million . . . . . 13.5 milllion . . . . . . 2.2 milllion

Source Nokia quarterly results

Yes, by every single measure, Elop in just 3 years, achieved worse results than Kallasvuo under four years. Bear in mind, OPK's period was also the economic world crisis, so all businesses reported bad results, all of Nokia's traditional full-portfolio handset maker rivals (the giants at the time, who made both dumbphones and smartphones, like Motorola, Samsung, LG and SonyEricsson) reported some quarters of losses in their handset units, except not Nokia. Nokia even under the very difficult economic times, under Kallasvuo, reported strong profits in the main business, handsets. Not until Elop did the handset unit implode and start to produce losses.

And yes, under OIlila Nokia share price grew, it fell under Kallasvuo, but it fell more, and fell faster, under Elop. Under Ollila Nokia's credit evaluation was a perfect AAA. Under Kallasvuo it dropped a little bit, to AA+. Under Elop, it was wipedout - Nokia is literally rated 'Junk' by all three ratings agences. Under Ollila Nokia grew into the Top 10 most valuable brands in the global Interbrand study with such brands as IBM, Coca Cola and McDonalds. It stayed there all through the 2000s decade and till Kallasvuo's tenure ended. Nokia was ranked 7th if I remember correctly, in 2010. After Elop came in, it dropped out of the Top 10 and today is down to 57. Interbrand says this is the fastest fall of any brand in history. Which corresponds with the world record falls Nokia faced in the market share - Nokia's fall in the past 2 and a half years has set a new world record for handset collapse, beating Palm, Motorola, Siemens, Blackberry etc, and after setting the world record for failure in 2011, Elop then went even further, by breaking his own world record in failure. The damage at Nokia is literally the worst in any global Fortune 500 market leader, worse than New Coke was to Coca Cola or the brakes failure to Toyota or the Deepwater Horizon oil spill was to BP. Elop has been not just the worst Nokia CEO, he's been the worst CEO of any Fortune 500 sized company, ever.

So, lets finally compare that Elop Effect. Was Nokia already in trouble, and Elop unable to fix the damage, or was Nokia a relatively healthy handset maker, whose profits were damaged by its under-performing networking unit, in 2010? Lets compare OPK's last quarter in charge, to Elop's first quarter in charge, and Elop's last quarter now:

QUARTERLY METRICS, ELOP START VS ELOP NEW STRATEGY (VS KALLASVUO LAST QUARTER)

Item . . . . . . . . . . Kallavuo Q2 2010 . . . Elop starts Q4 2010 . . Elop new strategy Q2 2013
Nokia Revenue . . . 10.1 B Euro . . . . . . . 12.7 B Euro . . . . . . . 5.7 B Euro
Profit/Loss . . . . . . 0.7 B Euro profit . . . . . 1.1 B Euro profit . . 0.1 B Euro loss

Handset Revenue . 6.8 B Euro . .  . . . . . 8.5 B Euro . . . . . . . . 2.7 B Euro
Handset profit . . . . 0.7 B Euro profit . . . 1.0 B Euro profit . . . . 0.03 B Euro loss

Handset units . . . . . 111.1 million . . . . . 123.7 million . . . . . . 61.1 million
Smartphone units . . . 24.0 million . . . . . . 28.3 million . . . . . . . 7.4 million

China sales . . . . . . . 19.3 milllion . . . . . 21.9 million . . . . . . . . 4.1 milllion
North America sales . 2.6 milllion . . . . . . . 2.6 million . . . . . . . . 0.5 milllion

Source Nokia quarterly results

Yes, Nokia was doing pretty well, truly improving on EVERY measure in the first six months that Elop was at Nokia. Every single rising statistic of vital Nokia performance was turned into catastrophic decline, next, by Elop. Why? Because he had 25 million dollars as a bonus to wreck Nokia rather than take a couple of million in performance incentives to continue this growth.

Please feel free to share the story. This is the biggest robbery we've seen in our lifetimes, how Elop robbed victory from Nokia shareholders and gave Nokia's handset unit as a wreck to Microsoft.

Comments

[Karl]

Nice work Tomi. Here is another take on the same story, The rise and fall of the Symbian empire: http://www.theverge.com/2013/9/18/4747002/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-symbian-empire

[RottenApple]

@Karl:

Ugh...

Now, that article reeks of warped perception of reality...

So, one can claim that the switch to WP was wrong (which it clearly was) but had Nokia continued with Symbian they'd have gone the same route as Blackberry (not a quick plunge into oblivion but a slow descent.) Granted, it would have given Nokia enough time to make a more controlled switch to any successor.

This article, though, treats Symbian as the Second Coming of God, and it clearly shows the attitude that made Nokia such a ripe target for utter destruction. If one has such a distorted view of one's own product it's obvious that wrong decisions are being made which ultimately lead to a shift into panic mode once they realize that it can't go on like this.

[Olav]

RottenApple, Symbian's days were certainly numbered but it was doing well. However, it was not the only or last option left. You have to take into account Meltemi and Meego, which Elop killed.

[daz]

Error: 2016 -> 2006
OPK became Nokia CEO in the Spring of 2016

[foo]

@RottenApple

I strongly agree with this point:

> had Nokia continued with Symbian they'd have gone the same route as Blackberry (not a quick plunge into oblivion but
> a slow descent.) Granted, it would have given Nokia enough time to make a more controlled switch to any successor.

This is the core of Elop's failed strategy.

He *killed* Symbian, replacing it with an unready version of an unpopular product.

Since the very beginning he talked not as Nokia's CEO, but Windows Phone's ambassador.

He didn't talk about how great Nokia's products were; he talked about "ecosystem wars", and invited competitors to join his (actually Microsoft's) ecosystem.

If Tomi ever writes the book, I hope he'll concentrate in 2011, when Elop destroyed Nokia's future. 2012 and 2013 were just consequences of the absurd decisions Elop took in 2011.

[foo]

@Tomi

> Every single rising statistic of vital Nokia performance was turned into catastrophic decline, next, by Elop. Why?
> Because he had 25 million dollars as a bonus to wreck Nokia rather than take a couple of million in performance
> incentives to continue this growth.

I still don't buy this theory.

I think that Elop wanted to help Nokia, but he also wanted -- in fact, was too eager -- to help Microsoft. The collapse was an unintended consequence of Elop's decisions (picking an unready version of an unpopular OS) and actions (pre-announcing the death of Symbian, trashing his own products, killing the alternatives, etc).

It is possible that sometime in 2012 he realized that Nokia was beyond salvation, and, for that reason, he started to make Nokia a better acquisition target. But I don't think this was his initial intention.

[Tom Gorr]

"Elop has been not just the worst Nokia CEO, he's been the worst CEO of any Fortune 500 sized company, ever."

If that is so, why is Microsoft taking him on? Surely they can see the figures?

They take him, because he did what was asked, and executed to the dot. For Nokia, he was a bad CEO. But it was all part of a plan and calling him stupid, is waste of breath. He is clever enough to get things done, and he managed most he set out to do.

[zlutor]

@Tomi: Any opinion on this: http://mynokiablog.com/2013/09/30/helsingin-sanomat-on-stephen-elop/comment-page-1/#comment-975601

“I base this on what professor Seppo Ikäheimo from Aalto University said in the YLE’s “A-studio: Talk” show this week. He said that after reading the public information about the original and revised CEO contract he cannot see any reason that the selling of Nokia’s feature and smartphone business would trigger the change of control clauses in the contracts. He says the only reason for paying Elop, based on the contracts, is that Nokia has some somehow breached the contracts. And I think the breach is that Nokia fired Elop.”

[Spawn]

@Tom Gorr

> If that is so, why is Microsoft taking him on? Surely they can see the figures?

Because at the end, with the cheap Nokia sell off to Microsoft, he saved WP and keeped a path forward alive.

There where and are alternate, better, bids on the table. There are still many alternate options. This chosen option, Elop spend many time on to make happen and cash the $25 millions, was saving a billion dollar investment. Microsoft says thanks and with taking him on (and even being as unrealistic as naming him a Microsoft CEO candidate) they also protect the dirty story behind.

> They take him, because he did what was asked, and executed to the dot.

Yes but he was asked to execute that plan B only after plan A - the Lumia disaster - failed thanks to him. At least he successfully applied plan B. Point is all his earlier dones are related to either plan A or plan B. So, those two options where on the table to begin with. Any alternate, any other option, was going against. He perfect combined them by moving Nokia all-in on WP and burning everything else along the way.

@zlutor

> after reading the public information

The public informations... What about for example all the MicroNokia-deal contracts which very likely contain all kind of extensions?

> And I think the breach is that Nokia fired Elop.

And no announcements? Possible that this, keeping silent, ismanother aspect of some of the secret contracts.

[RottenApple]

@Olav:

"RottenApple, Symbian's days were certainly numbered but it was doing well."

Isn't that a contradiction in terms? Either it's doing well and no actions are needed or it's not doing well enough which indicates that something needs to be done.

"However, it was not the only or last option left. You have to take into account Meltemi and Meego, which Elop killed."

I know. I was criticising the attitude of the linked article which clearly shows a delusional view of Symbian.

Had Symbian been such a great OS, all Nokia had needed was a UI facelift and some more modern hardware and they'd been set for the coming years.

[Henry]

Hi to all, I would do some remarks from 'inside' regarding Symbian just before and after Elop's arrival. I was in the design team of Symbian products at that time. When he arrived Nokia had just launched the first Symbian3 capacitive touchscreen products (N8, C7,E7). The products were received well from an hardware point of view, but the sw resulted to be disappointing for the consumers, especially the Internet browser. The main problem of Symbian was simply that it was designed few years before Android, and resulted very difficult to modify (and debug)for multimedia applications. So the sales we had in the first months were decent, but inferior to the expectations. Nokia had obviously lost appeal respect to Apple and Google. Obviously Nokia knew it and were coming new OS, Meego in front of all. After the famous 'burning platform' speech we began to see a steep decline in the sale of our Symbian products, because the carriers didn't want them and the sw was not even liked too much. I remember that it was very frustrating for us, after a lot of effort and time spent in the lab. In my opinion one of the 'hidden' ways in which Elop steered forcedly Nokia towards Microsoft was not only dashing internal OS and refusing to try Android, but also making redundant 'in advance' thousands of skilled and experienced engineers. In the first round (end of April) just after the announcement of Windows for Nokia he fired 7000 people (about 3000 thousands were sofwarists, moved to Accenture, whose majority was anyway made quickly redundant by Accenture), and closed straight two big phone development centres (Copenhagen and Farnborough in UK). Most of the people made redundant were skilled and experienced designers, that could have easily diverted to other 'Plan B' projects. We had other redundancies during 2011, and there was another big round of redundancies (about 10000) in Spring 2012, when Elop cancelled Meltemi, shutting down also Ulm centre, that had a direct role in the development. In summary, the strong reduction of resources made in any case impossible for Nokia to develop serious product lines with OS different from the one in force (Windows), if not killing it, and made Nokia fate bound to Windows one. It would have been possible to do something different in parallel, it was not done and so we'll never know what would have been Nokia now with an Android or a Meego line on the market.

[RottenApple]

For god's sake, Baron, please stop spreading your anti European FUD!

When Elop took over, Nokia was still dominating the non-US market. Samsung was peanuts in comparison.

So, please, what on Earth made Nokia so much inferior to Samsung had they had to compete on even ground?

Nokia was out-executing Samsung easily for the previous decade, so please, why would they have stood no chance against Samsung? Nothing you said gives a good explanation for it.

Nokia already had the market, all they needed to do was stuff the channel with desirable products and they'd have won by default.
People were WAITING for Nokia to go Android - yes - imagine that! Most Europeans who were planning to upgrade would have eagerly waited a bit if they could get a Nokia phone instead od Samsung. Well, as Elop decided it wasn't to happen - and the result was an instant crash. With their past reputation they would have easily crushed Samsung who aren't really that popular, just considered the least of all evils.

But I guess that's something an American will never be able to understand.

[winter]

@RottenApple
Boron95 plays according to the book: Repeat lies until they have become "true" and never ever admit counter arguments and fact even deserve mentioning.

[So Vatar]

@RottenApple
Baron does not add any new insight to the discussion. He repeats the same stuff over and over again and hopes that something sticks. He is not open to an honest discussion, has his pre-determined picture of the world, and interprets everything using only his narrow frame.

He is sometimes funny and sometimes just over the top. But he is not to be taken seriously. I would just ignore him.

(And Tomi, as this post has really nothing to do with OPK vs Flop please delete it once you've read it. Thanks.)

[RottenApple]

"He is sometimes funny and sometimes just over the top. But he is not to be taken seriously. I would just ignore him."

I know, but I still believe that more casual readers have to be made aware that he's a plant intent on promoting American business interests. :D

[NW]

Hi Tomi,

Is there any possibility that the Nokia board could reject the deal? If they do, presumably Mr Elop will be back at Microsoft and his successor will have to pick a new OS such as Jolla for the future :)

[Henry]

@Baron95
I've never written what you are saying, that is that Nokia had tens of thousands of people working on OS. Android had 500 people because they worked on the sw design of the OS alone.
From what you write, it's pretty clear that you don't understand so much of mobile communications and engineering in general. A phone is a very complicate product: the design implies not only sw for the OS, but also mechanics, electronics (platform design), IC design, radio frequency, audio and acoustics, digital signal processing, quality control and planning, platforms, integration (mechanical, sw and hw), production control, reliability test,also management, planning and marketing (that are not strictly engineering)..only a part of the people involved worked in sw for the OS. A phone is a very small product, but very complicate. You don't need thousands of people to design an OS, so didn't Android, you can need thousands when you develop a complete line of products around it, because are necessary all the functions I've just mentioned. Nokia had employed a lot of people also because they launched many products every year; obviously, if you launch less products, you'll need less people. To summarize, you have completely misunderstood my writing. I don't know how many people should leave now, if anyone has to leave, but you cannot claim that 'another 20k people now need to go', showing at the same time poor knowledge of technology processes.

[Giacomo Di Giacomo]

@NW
It is not the board that is going to decide about the sale, but the shareholders. Who are the controlling shareholders, though, I do not know. Most of Nokia stock is held by institutional investors, who usually do not vote. So, there is a fair chance that the controlling shareholders are the board members themselves, thanks to the stock options they got. Which means that they will sell Nokia D&S to M$ for a ridiculous price in return for personal profits, therefore robbing the other shareholders. Note that this is just speculation on my side and I do not have any source for this.

[Patrick]

@NW "Is there any possibility that the Nokia board could reject the deal? If they do, presumably Mr Elop will be back at Microsoft and his successor will have to pick a new OS such as Jolla for the future :)"

Giacomo is spot on but I'll also add that if the deal (although highly unlikely) doesn't come through, Elop will return to Nokia as CEO. Talk about a catch 22, eh? :D

The shareholders event might be quite interesting, I wonder if they will hold a decent Q&A? It seems like the Finnish people, albeit too late, kind of woke up and realized that Nokia alone stands for over 40% of Finland's total R&D.

Add some very dark clouds in the economy of Finland to the picture as well as the total wipe-out of Nokia market share & profits under Elops (and board) reign - Might be a really nice show.

[e_lm_70]

Disappointed.

Once again, my comment got deleted by Tomi.

I just wanted to make more visible the fact that judge a CEO alone is not enough.

The CEO and the board are elected by mayor share holders. This aspect has been too often minimized or not consider by Tomi.

If you miss to analyze who is behind Elop, the role of Jorma , etc ... you are missing the real actors and the real motivation.

On the other side the comment from Baron95 the Micro & Soft troll from West Cost that are totally off topic and off sense ... are abundant here.

Bye

e_lm_70